Abstract
Introduction
With the proliferation of handheld wireless information appliances, the ability to perform security functions with limited computing resources has become increasingly important. In mobile devices such as personal digital assistants (PDAs) and multimedia cell phones [5], the processing resources, memory.and power are all very limited, but the need for secure transmission of information may increase due to the vulnerability to attackers of the publicly accessible wireless transmission channel. The problem is further compounded by the fact that security algorithms can be very compute-intensive, which conflicts with the scarce resources available in such a mobile platform.
New smaller and faster security algorithms provide part of the solution. In symmetric-key cryptography for example, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [2,17,18,20] became the new U.S. federal standard for block encryption and it is much leaner and faster than the previous Data Encryption Standard (DES) I191, which it is intended to replace. Likewise, the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [1,10,16] provides a faster alternative for public-key cryptography. Much smaller key lengths are required with ECC to provide a desired level of security, which means faster key exchanges, user authentication, signature generation and verification, in addition to smaller key storage needs.
Even though much literature exists about these algorithms that focus on algorithmic optimizations and hardware implementations [6,7,8,23], workload characterization studies are very rare. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive workload characterization of security algorithms suitable for constrained environments. We consider elliptic curve analogs of Diffie-Hellman key exchange (EC-DHKE), ElGamal (EC-EIGamal) and the Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-DSA) for public-key cryptography; the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for symmetric-key cryptography; and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) [22] as a hash algorithm for data integrity.
Algorithm set
We consider four broad categories of security functions: ( I ) public-key algorithms, which are required for key exchanges; (2) signature algorithms, which are required for user authentication; (3) symmetric-key algorithms, which are required to encrypt and decrypt messages for confidentiality; (4) hash functions, which are used to verify the integrity of messages. Table 1 shows which specific algorithms are used as representative of each of these classes.
In general, we have chosen to study the newer algorithms from each class that are suitable for constrained environments, and about which there have been few workload characterization studies. The only exception is the Secure Hash Algorithm [22], which has been a standard since 1993, but is included for completeness.
Because elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) algorithms involve mathematical operations that may be new to the architecture community, we describe important ECC characteristics in the following sections. IO] suggested independently that elliptic curves could he used to perform public-key security functions (e.g. key exchanges, digital signatures). Furthermore, certain unique properties of elliptic curves made them resilient against the types of attacks that were successful against integer-based algorithms. Therefore an elliptic-curve algorithm (e.g. Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm = EC-DSA) could have the same level of security of a similar integer-based algorithm (e.g. Digital Signature Algorithm = DSA) using much fewer key bits. Table 2 shows, the number of key hits necessary to have equivalent levels of security for integer-based algorithms versus elliptic-curve algorithms. For the most commonly used 1024-bit keys for an integer-based algorithm the elliptic-curve counterpan only requires 160-bit keys for the equivalent security. This is a 7x reduction in the space required to store these keys, or a similar reduction in bandwidth required to transmit these keys over a wireless network. Furthermore, this reduction in the size of data objects allows much faster completion of ihe algorithms. 
Parameters for ECC
Implementation of elliptic curve cryptography involves the selection of a suitable elliptic curve (determined by the coefficients in the elliptic curve equation), the representation of field elements (e.g. a binary field or a prime field), algorithms for field arithmetic and elliptic-curve arithmetic. The standards provide suggestions for the selection of elliptic curves and representation of field elements. FIPS 186-2 [21] recommends a total of ten curves for binary fields: two different curves for each of 163-bit, 233-bit, 283-hit, 409-bit and 571-hit fields. We limit the scope of this study to these ten curves on binary fields, and choose polynomial basis representation for the field elements, which allows faster implementation on programmable processors.
The next section reviews the basic arithmetic operations on polynomials, such as polynomial addition and multiplication, which we will be using frequently in the security algorithms.
Polynomial arithmetic
In the polynomial basis representation of a binary field, each field element can be viewed as a polynomial whose coefficients are either 0 or 1. As an. example, consider the 163-hit binary field, also denoted GF(2'63), recommended in [21] . The following two polynomials a(x) and b(x) are elements of this field
In polynomial addition, the coefficients of the Sam:
powers of x are added component-wise. Since a coefficient can only be 0 or 1, this corresponds to an XOR operation on the coefficients. For example, a(x) is added to b ( x ) to yield c(x) as:
In a software implementation for a 64-bit ISA, each of the polynomials above will fit into three registers, and a single polynomial addition will therefore require three XOR instructions (Algorithm 1).
Similar to addition, polynomial multiplication is also component-wise. The key difference is that multiplication may produce a product polynomial that is longer than the multiplicands. Whenever the product is a polynomial of degree greater than 162, it needs to be reduced by the irreducible polynomial p(x) = x163 + x1 + x6 + x' + I that is specified in [21] . 
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The simplest algorithm for polynomial multiplication is the shift-and-add algorithm (Algorithm 2). It is presented for illustrative purposes because of its simplicity. The second algorithm, Algorithm 3, is described in [E] and is significantly faster than the shiftand-add algorithm but requires more storage for the table lookups involved.
Algorithm 2 differs from Algorithm 3 in that it does not perform reduction along with multiplication. In Algorithm 2, reduction happens in each iteration in Step 2.1. .Therefore, a separate polynomial reduction (Algorithm 4) needs to follow Algorithm 3 each time it is used., Polynomial squaring can be performed using Algorithm 2 or 3 to multiply the input polynomial by itself. However a dedicated algorithm for polynomial squaring gives faster results. Atgorithm 5 is a tablelookup based method and it exploits the linearity of the squaring operation in binary fields. If a ( x ) = C , then a2(x) =c i2;aixzi. This operation corresponds to inserting zeros between the consecutive bits in the binary representation of a(x). This is facilitated by using a 512-byte 
Dime-Hellman key exchange
This section focuses on the elliptic-curve DiffieHellman key exchange as an example to illustrate the differences of elliptic-curve algorithms from integer algorithms. We first review the integer version.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange (integer)
Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHKE) [3] is used to establish a shared key between two parties over a public channel. It is based on the multiplicative group Z; of integers, where p is a prime. The security of the integer Difie-Hellman is based on the Discrete Ugarithm problem: given p. a and aT, it is computationally infeasible to compute a (for sufficiently large p). Therefore, even though an eavesdropper may capture the intermediate values aT and bT as they are exchanged ovcr the public channel, neither a nor b will be exposed, and therefore the final key K remains known only to Alice and Bob.
Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange
Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (EC-DHKE) is similar to the integer version except that it uses the points on an elliptic-curve rather than integers ( Figure   2 ). We assume that Alice and Bob have previously agreed on a binary field GF(2'). a c o m n elliptic curve E with suitable coefficients6, and a base point P=(x,y), which lies on E and has order n. This multiplication is computed by a sequence of doublings and additions of the elliptic curve point (akin to the shift-and-add chains that were used for multiplication of two polynomials). Consider: ComDute AT Comuute Br
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The security of the EC-DHKE is based on the ellipticcurve Discrete Logarithm problem: given GF(2'), E, P, AT, it is computationally infeasible to compute a (for sufficiently large k and n). Unlike the integer discrete logarithm problem, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem has no known sub-exponential time solutions (for a well-chosen set of system parameters6). Accordingly, a given level of security can be achieved with a k smaller than the number of bits required to encode the p in the integer Difiie-Hellman key exchange. Table 3 provides a comparison of the basic features of 1024-bit integer Diffie-Hellman and 160-bit elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchanges.
Point multiplication on elliptic curves
Steps 2 and 4 in Figure 2 involve operations on the elliptic curve points. The operator x denotes the multiplication of an elliptic curve point by a field element.
' Nomenclature for Figure 2: n and b are scalm. A scalar is an element of the field GF(2'). As explained in Section 4, addition and multiplication of two $calm is polynomial addition and multiplication respectively. P. AT and Er are points on the elliptic curve. Each poinl on the elliptic curve is determined by its two coordinates. Example: P = (x,y). We coordinates of points are elements of the field GF(2'). Addition of two points on the elliptic c u m is called p i n 1 addition and it is performed with the wpence of formulas desuibed in Section 6.
The result of such a point addition is another point on the curve. The operator X denotes point multiplication. Example: AT = P x o , whereby the point P on the elliptic curve is added IO itself a timer. The result A r i l another paint on the curve. a Key le@ in bits for equivalent sec!Lrity. Also see Table 2 . 2. Compute x3 ='e2 + e t x , t x, t a .
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EC-ElGamal, EC-DSA, AES and SHA
Elliptic-curve ElGamal (EC-EIGamal) (Figure 3) is the elliptic-curve analog of the integer ElGamal algorithm described in [4] . It is used to securely transmit the coordinates of the point P,,, from Alice to Bob (assume that the original plaintext m is embedded in P, , , ). We assunk that Alice and Bob have previously agreed on a binary field GF(23, a common elliptic curve E with suitable coefficients6, and a base point P=(x,y), which lies on E and has order n.
Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-DSA) is based on the ElGamal algorithm and has three different segments: key generation, signature generation and signature verification. These steps are summarized in Figure 4 , where Alice signs the message m and Bob verifies the signature.
The Detailed descriptions of the AES algorithm can be found in [2, 6] including some optimizations. We report our findings in workload characterization for two AES implementations.
The first is the reference implementation, the second is a table-lookup based optimized implementation, both described in [Z] .
The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is part of the Secure Hash Standard SHS [22]. It is a message-digest function that reads a variable-length input and produces a 160-bit hash of the input. The function that computes the hash is one-way, meaning that it is computationally infeasible to search for an input that evaluates to a given hash value. Because of this one-way property, SHA is used in the Digital Signature Standard 1211 to increase efficiency. Instead of signing a long message, only the hash of the message is signed.
ID S H A W represents the hash of the message m computed with the Secure Hash Algorithm described in Section 7 and in [ZZ] .
Methodology and discussion of results
Methodology
All the algorithms are coded and optimized in assembly using simple RISC instructions that execute in a single cycle. Assembly coding minimizes the code size, which is important for constrained environments. The RISC ISA has a Whit datapath and 32 general integer registers. Of these, R31 is used as stack pointer, WO as frame pointer. RO is hardwired to zero; any value written to it is discarded. Only 22 simple instructions are actually used, and these are listed in Table 7 , we report instruction frequencies for each of the polynomial operation algorithms described in Section 4. We then select two subsets of these algorithms, to achieve a basic implementation (Setting I) and an optimized implementation (Setting 11) of the ECC algorithms (see Table 6 ). Setting I simulates the simpler algorithms for each polynomial operation. Shift-and-add method (Algorithm 2 ) is used for multiplication and squaring, and extended Euclidean algorithm (Algorithm 6) is used for inversion. Setting I1 uses the optimized algorithms. Here, comb method (Algorithm 3) is used for multiplication, Algorithm 4 is used for reduction, tablelookup method (Algorithm 5) is used for squaring, and the modified Almost Inverse Algorithm (Algorithm 7) is used for inversion. In both Settings I and 11, Algorithm I is used for polynomial addition.
For the elliptic-curve algorithms, we compute workload results for each of the ten curves recommended in [21], although for space reasons, we report results only for key size of 163 bits in Table 7 , and for 163 bits and 233 bits in Table 8 .
For the cycle counts and speedup calculations, we keep the microarchitecture simple by simulating a singleissue processor. We assume a pelfect memory system. where the memory accesses for loads and stores take a single cycle. Instructions are scheduled to eliminate or minimize the pipeline stalls caused by data dependencies.
Table 6
Arithmetic algorithms used in each setting (the numbers refer to the algorithms described in Section 4)
Discussion of results
For many of the polynomial operation algorithms in Table 7 , the memory instructions (loads and stores) are as frequent as the compute instructions (arithmetic, logical, and shift). Exceptions are the reduction algorithm (Algorithm 4) and the inversion algorithms (Algorithms 6 and 7). which are slightly more compute-intensive. The high percentage of memory instructions (25% to 49%) is due to two factors: (1) the function call overhead, which involves saving and restoring register states at each function call, and (2) the large size of the polynomials, which cannot he kept in the register tile during computations and must be written to and read from memory frequently. Arithmetic instructions have over 30% share for Algorithms 1, 2 and 6, while shift instructions are also prominent in Algorithms 3.4,s and 7 with 19% to 28% share. Of the logical instructions, the xor is the most frequent one because it performs the basic polynomial addition operation. Table 8 shows the speedup attainable by using more optimized software algorithms for the different polynomial operations in the three ECC algorithms. This speedup is huge, from 12 to 17 times faster with software optimization. Otherwise, the instruction class distribution is roughly consistent across different field lengths, as well as different algorithms. For all algorithms and field sizes in Setting I, compute instructions comprise 48% to 51% of the instructions, while memory instructions comprise 31% to 38% of the instructions executed. In Setting 11, compute instructions comprise a reduced 34% to 40% of the instructions, while memory instructions comprise a larger 45% to 48% of the instructions executed. Looking more closely, arithmetic instructions decrease from over 30% of the instruction mix in Setting I to under 20% in Setting 11. The other instruction classes (logical, shift, branches) keep roughly the same percentages, while stores increase slightly, from Setting I to II. The algorithmic optimizations appear to provide speedup mainly by reducing arithmetic instructions. Table IO, derived from Table 8 , shows the increase in the ratio of dynamic instruction counts when the field size is increased from 163 bits to 233 hits. For example, the fust value in this table is 2.55, which indicates that the EC-DHKE on the.233-hit field contains 2.55 times as many arithmetic instructions as the EC-DHKE on the 163-bit field, in simulation Setting I. We observe that overall, dynamic instruction counts increase from 2.2 to 2.8 times their previous levels. This shows the expected non-linearity in the complexity of the algorithm. While the field size increases to 1.42 times its previous value (163 bits to 233 bits), the pathlength of the algorithms increases to about 2.5 times its previous value. Table 12 compares the relative instruction frequencies of the three elliptic curve algorithms studied. The values in this table are the ratios of the instruction frequencies of EC-EIGamal and EC-DSA to the instruction frequencies of EC-DHKE, which is the base algorithm because of its simplicity. For example, the first value in this table is 0.99, which shows that the frequency of the arithmetic instructions in EC-EIGamal is 0.99 times the frequency of the arithmetic instructions in EC-DHKE under Setting I on a 163-hit field. In general, the ratios across all instruction classes are close to I for both EC-EIGamal and EC-DSA. This is because of the similarity of the algorithms; they all are based on elliptic-curve point multiplication. The only significant divergence is in the share of the logical instructions for EC-DSA, which is about 1.5 times as high as in EC-DHKE. This is because the EC-DSA includes SHA computations, which drives up the logical instruction count. As Table 9 indicates, SHA is heavily reliant on logical instructions.
Conclusions
The contributions of this paper are: (1) a selection of cryptography algorithms suitable for constrained environments, (2) a description of the operations used by Elliptic Curve Cryptography algorithms, (3) a characterization of the instructions executed by these algorithms, and (4) demonstration that a simple processor is sufficient. We show the. operations and instructions needed by elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange, elliptic-curve EIGamal, elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm, elliptic-curve arithmetic operations, the Advanced Encryption Standard, and the Secure Hash Algorithm. The importance of these algorithms is verified by the fact that all of them are either standards by themselves, or are part of a larger standard.
For the elliptic curve algorithms, we focused ow implementations on binary fields using polynomial basis representation. 
